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NUNO MARTINS
 
1. INTRODUCTION
 
In non-cooperative game theory—and also in microeconomic theory in general—
social behaviour is explained under the assumption that human action is permanently
driven by the pursuit of  individual goals, which Amartya Sen (2002) calls the
agent’s “self-goals”. Sen criticises this approach, and argues that the explanation
of  social behaviour should take into account that human agents are: capable of
seeing themselves as part of  a “community” (with which they share a common
“identity”); and capable of  following rules of  behaviour towards members of
this community that may be out of  phase with their own (individual) “self-goals”.
Throughout this paper I argue that Sen’s critique of  game theory (and of  main-
stream economic theory in general) can be fruitfully linked to John Searle’s (1995)
notion of  collective intentionality, and also to the critical realist transformational
model of  social activity, as developed by such authors as Margaret Archer (1995, 2000),
Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1989) and Tony Lawson (1997, 2003), amongst others. I suggest
that a conception where social rules are ontologically irreducible to (albeit emergent
from) human agency, in line with the critical realist transformational model of
social activity, can solve some possible inconsistencies in Sen’s approach.
Section 2 of  the paper scrutinises the nature of  Sen’s contribution. Section 3
examines Sen’s critique of  game theory. In section 4 I argue that Searle’s notion
of  collective intentionality can be fruitfully linked to Sen’s critique, and Sen’s idea
of  “collective” identity. In section 5 I will identify a possible tension in Sen’s
conception of  social behaviour, and in section 6 I will suggest the critical realist
transformational model of  social activity as a solution to such tension. In section
7 I will examine the causal role of  social structures, and in section 8 I will discuss
the underlying capacities and dispositions of  the human agent. Some concluding
remarks will be made in section 9.
 
2. THE NATURE OF SEN’S CONTRIBUTION
 
In order to understand Sen’s critique of  mainstream game theory, one must note
that he does not provide a complete theory of  social behaviour. In fact, Sen does
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not so much provide an alternative theory, as the conceptual tools for a theory of
social behaviour to be developed, by scrutinising the nature of  social and
economic behaviour at a more general level. In so doing, Sen engages (albeit
without explicitly acknowledging it) in what may be termed as an exercise in
social ontology.
By ontology I mean an enquiry to the nature of  reality. Hence, social ontology
is concerned with social being, and investigates the entities that exist in social
reality and their properties. Social being refers to the part of  reality that depends
at least in part upon human beings—see Lawson (1997, 2003). The purpose of
an ontological investigation is to understand categories based upon which social
science can proceed, but not necessarily to develop a substantive social theory
using such categories. Although ontological categories are of  course used in social
sciences, there is a difference between clarifying what they mean, and using them
to construct a specific social theory.
The study of  the ontological presuppositions of  scientific research, or of
social activity in general, is based on what Lawson calls the 
 
intelligibility principle
 
,
according to which “all actual practices, whether or not scientific, and whether or
not successful on their own terms, have explanations” (Lawson 2003: 33). Of
course, as Lawson (2003: 33/34) also notes, any ontological analysis of  the
conditions of  possibility of  human practices will be conditional on the premises
chosen, that is, on the practices which we select in order to initiate such
ontological study.
Now, ontology can be undertaken at different levels of  abstraction: either in
order to understand which entities constitute social being; or, at a more abstract
level, in order to clarify the general properties of  those entities and of  social reality.
Explicitly ontological contributions often work at a higher level of  abstraction,
describing not only social entities, but also the more general properties of  those
entities and of  the social realm—properties such as “causality” or “interconnectivity”,
for example. Authors like Margaret Archer (1995, 2000), Roy Bhaskar (1975,
1989), Tony Lawson (1997, 2003), and John Searle (1995), have explicitly devel-
oped a social ontology, concerned with scrutinising the more general properties
of  the social realm.
Unlike Archer, Bhaskar, Lawson and Searle, Sen does not explicitly elaborate
the more general properties of  the social realm. Sen’s critique of  game theory
leads him to engage in an ontological description of  human behaviour at a
general level, taking into account the role of  social rules and identity in
such behaviour—and an analysis of  Sen’s overall contribution would show that
he also engages in the ontological analysis of  social entities like functionings,
capabilities or well-being—see Martins (2006, 2007b).
Sen’s criticism of  modern economic theory, and of  game theory, has been
paralleled by his suggestion that economics can benefit greatly from a closer
contact with ethics. Hilary Putnam (2002) and Vivian Walsh (2000, 2003)
consider this return to an integrated view of  ethics and economics to be the
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essence of  the “Senian” project, a project in which economics recovers the rich
philosophical anthropology that constitutes part of  the legacy of  Adam Smith.
Now, one could argue that the main emphasis of  Sen’s work on social
behaviour has been on the ethical dimension of  human behaviour, rather than on
the ontological aspects of  the latter. However, such a claim presupposes a clear
distinction between ethics and ontology, and ethics and ontology cannot be
separated in Sen’s contribution—for elaborations, see Martins (2007a). It is true
that a complete understanding of  Sen’s analysis of  social structures and
rule-following behaviour cannot disregard the prescriptive dimension of  social
rules. Sen has consistently argued for the importance of  incorporating prescriptive
ethical motivations, such as moral imperatives, in economic analysis.
Nevertheless, one must distinguish between a conception of  ethics where
ontology (supposedly) plays no role, and ethics would be exclusively concerned
with prescriptive criteria for decision-making, and an integrated view of  ethics
and ontology, where ethical evaluation is much concerned with the description of
the space to which prescriptive criteria are to be applied (such as the space of
capabilities or functionings), or with categories like “social rules”, “identity”,
“commitment”, and the like, and their impact on behaviour, from an ontological
point of  view.
Adam Smith’s (2002 [1759]) 
 
Theory of  Moral Sentiments
 
 is an example of  an ethical
treatise with an integrated view of  ethical prescription and ontological description,
that underpins Smith’s analysis of  concepts like “sympathy” and “prudence”—
which is at many stages essentially descriptive (aimed at understanding what these
concepts mean, not at obtaining prescriptive criteria or moral imperatives).
Another example of  an integrated perspective of  ethics and ontology can be
found in the writings of  Aristotle, where the emphasis is on the description of
virtuous habits and dispositions.
In a similar vein to Adam Smith and Aristotle—who Sen (1999) recognises as
key influences of  his own writings—Sen’s work on ethics has been more concerned
with ontological description, by elaborating such categories as “social rules”,
“identity”, “commitment”, “capabilities”, “functionings”, “well-being”, and the
like, from an ontological point of  view, and not with prescriptive ethical criteria
only. If  bringing ethics into economics means not only to make prescriptive
judgments, but also to engage in an ontological description of  spaces like capabilities
or functionings, or of  social norms of  conduct, then Sen’s project is clearly permeated
by an ontological dimension. When Sen speaks of  ethics, it is this Smithian and
Aristotelian approach to ethics (concerned not only with prescription, but
especially with ontological description) that Sen has in mind.
 
1
 
Sen’s suggestion of  a greater contact between ethics and economics opens a
wide variety of  possible avenues of  research in economic analysis. But in
order to understand the characteristics of  social behaviour that Sen discusses, it
is necessary to elaborate more on their ontological conditions of  possibility. Whilst
Sen’s contribution can be interpreted as an exercise in ontological description
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(and not just in ethical prescription), he does not engage in the (more abstract)
ontological analysis of  the properties of  the social realm.
I will argue that the social ontology of  Searle, and also the contributions of
critical realism, can be very useful for elaborating and clarifying Sen’s conception
of  social reality at a more general level, that is, at the level of  the properties which
underpin the ontological entities that Sen describes. I will present now Sen’s
critique of  mainstream game theory, and afterwards clarify Sen’s conception of
social behaviour by focusing on an ontological dimension of  Sen’s work that has
been relatively neglected in the literature.
 
3. GAME THEORY, SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
 
In traditional game theory analysis, human behaviour is explicated under the
assumption that human action is permanently driven by the pursuit of  individual
goals. It is assumed that agents know which strategy maximises their individual
payoffs, and invariably follow such a strategy. Sen (1987, 2002) provides a critique
of  this explanation of  human behaviour. Sen (2002) notes that the self-interested
behavioural structure of  the human agent that underpins mainstream (micro)eco-
nomic theory (including mainstream game theory) posits what he describes as the
three features of  the self: “self-centred welfare”, “self-welfare goal” and “self-goal
choice”. “Self-centred welfare” means that the individual’s welfare is not affected
by the welfare of  other agents; “self-welfare goal” means that the individual has
no goal other than her or his welfare (even though the latter may be affected by
the welfare of  other agents, or not); and “self-goal choice” signifies that all the
individual’s choices are made in accordance with her or his goals (regardless of
how the latter are defined).
A much debated issue in game theory is how social cooperation can arise
when: (a) it is always advantageous for each individual not to cooperate (regard-
less of  whether other individuals cooperate or not); and (b) all individuals would
be better off  if  all would cooperate, rather than if  there were no cooperation. One
example often discussed in this context is the “prisoner’s dilemma” situation,
where in a “one-shot” game it is always better for a player not to cooperate (both
in the case where the other player cooperates and in the case where (s)he does
not, and so “not cooperating” is a dominant strategy, that is, it is preferred regard-
less of  what other players do), but if  both players would cooperate, both would
achieve a higher level of  welfare.
 
2
 
The dominance of  non-cooperative strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma springs
from the fact that agents are supposed to pursue their “self-goals” only, and can
happen even in the absence of  “self-centred welfare” and “self-welfare goal”. For
example, agents with altruistic concerns (which need not include any concerns
with their own welfare, and need not be self-centred as well, but would be
individual goals nevertheless) might still, for some reason, have these “altruistic”
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goals ranked in the same way as payoffs are usually ranked in the prisoner’s
dilemma. Hence, even without “self-centred welfare” and “self-welfare goal”, the
existence of  “self-goal choice” would be a sufficient condition for the emergence
of  a prisoner’s dilemma situation—see also Derek Parfit (1981, 1984).
In fact, even when “self-goals” include not only the agents’ welfare, but also
any other type of  individual goals (such as a concern with the welfare of  other
agents), those “self-goals” would be still individual goals (regardless of  how
broadly defined), and Sen’s point is that social behaviour is irreducible to
individualistic “self-goal” pursuit. Sen argues that the key to resolve the prisoner’s
dilemma is to think “in terms of  social strategy” (Sen 1987: 86), instead of  trying
to derive these social aspects from individualistic interplay:
 
“Behaviour is ultimately a social matter as well, and thinking in terms of  what ‘we’ should do,
or what should be ‘our’ strategy, may reflect a sense of  identity involving recognition of  other
people’s goals and the mutual interdependencies involved. [. . .] The language of  game
theory—and indeed of  economic theory—makes it hard to discuss behaviour patterns of  this
kind, since it is very tempting to think that whatever a person may appear to be maximizing, on
a simple interpretation, must be that person’s goal.” (Sen 1987: 85)
 
Sen suggests starting from the social notion of  the “identity” of  a community,
instead of  trying to explain social behaviour in terms of  the individual interaction
of  self-goal pursuing agents:
 
“The rejection of  self-goal choice reflects a type of  commitment that is not able to be captured
by the broadening of  the goals to be pursued. It calls for behavior norms that depart from the
pursuit of  goals in certain systematic ways. Such norms can be analyzed in terms of  a sense of
‘identity’ generated in a community (without leading to a congruence of  goals), and it has close
links with the case for rule-based conduct, discussed by Adam Smith. [. . .] It is an alternative
program to the recent attempts at ‘resolving’ the [prisoner’s] dilemma through the relaxation of
the assumption of  mutual knowledge in finitely repeated games.” (Sen 2002: 219/220)
 
It is important to note that the target of  Sen’s criticism is only traditional game
theory, where it is presupposed that agents permanently engage in the pursuit of
their self-goals. Sen offers no criticism of  approaches to game theory which do
not presuppose permanent self-goal pursuit, such as evolutionary game theory
approaches where conventions are the key element to explanation.
In fact, Sen (1997) supports evolutionary game theory, arguing that it can
provide important insights to the study of  behavioural norms and rule-based
conduct. Furthermore, authors studying conventions from a game theory perspective
often adopt a conception of  “we-rationality” which is very close to Sen’s (1987) notion
of  “social strategy”—see, for example, Sugden (2000), or Hollis and Sugden (1993).
Nevertheless, notions like “rule-based conduct” and “sense of  identity” with a
community require further analysis. What are the conditions of  possibility for this
type of  social behaviour? And what does it mean to identify with others? I will try
to clarify these points in the next sections.
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4. BELIEFS, COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND SOCIAL RULES
 
Sen’s conception of  collective identity can be fruitfully linked to John Searle’s
notion of  collective intentionality, which means to “share intentional states such
as beliefs, desires, and intentions” (Searle 1995: 23). Searle argues that the
collective intentionality of  a community is irreducible to the singular intentionality
of  individual agents:
 
“What is the relation between singular and collective intentionality, between, for example, the
facts described by ‘I intend’ and ‘We intend’? Most efforts I have seen to answer this question
try to reduce ‘We intentionality’ to ‘I intentionality’ plus something else, usually mutual beliefs.
The idea is that if  we intend to do something together, then that consists in the fact that I intend
to do it in the belief  that you also intend to do it; and you intend to do it in the belief  that I also
intend to do it. And each believes that the other has these beliefs, and has these beliefs about
these beliefs . . . etc., in a potentially infinite hierarchy of  beliefs. ‘I believe that you believe that
I believe that you believe that I believe . . . ,’ and so on. In my view, all these efforts to reduce
collective intentionality to individual intentionality fail. Collective intentionality is a biologically
primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of  something else.”
(Searle 1995: 24)
 
Searle concludes that:
 
“The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of  doing (wanting, believing, etc.)
something together, and the individual intentionality that each person has is derived 
 
from
 
 the
collective intentionality that they share.” (Searle 1995: 24/25, emphasis in original)
 
Searle uses the expression “social fact” to refer to “any fact involving collective
intentionality” (Searle 1995: 26). Collective intentionality is a condition of
possibility for us to follow social rules of  behaviour. Whenever we occupy a given
social position (such as being citizen of  a country, member of  a family or teacher
at a university), there will be a set of  rules we are expected to follow and, likewise,
a set of  rules we expect people in other social positions to follow towards us.
But whenever following rules, people who occupy different positions in a
network of  interrelated social positions will all be engaging in a form of  collective
behaviour, in which they share intentions, beliefs and desires. For example, if  a
person X follows a given rule of  behaviour when relating to person Y (for
example, when person X pays a good bought at person Y’s store), both X and Y
(who occupy the social position of  buyer and seller, respectively) are engaging in
a form of  collective behaviour (in this case, commercial exchange) which requires
shared intentionality.
Collective intentionality can be seen as a condition of  possibility of  Sen’s notion
of  “identity” of  a community. Identifying ourselves with a community means to
recognise ourselves as part of  a social structure, and place ourselves in a given
social position within an interrelated network of  social positions (each associated
with a set of  social rules), through which we are connected to the other members
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of  the community. Sen’s idea of  acting in terms of  
 
our
 
 strategy, as opposed to
permanently engaging in individualistic self-goal pursuit, presupposes Searle’s
notion of  doing something together (sharing beliefs, desires and intentions when
acting in accordance with the rules of  behaviour that are attached to each social
position in a given social structure), following a social strategy—as opposed to an
individual strategy.
Hence, collective intentionality enables the emergence of  a “collective” identity,
which in turn provides the basis for the formation of  social structures—following
Lawson (2003), social structures can in turn be seen as constituted by an inter-
related network of  social positions, with each position attached to given social
rules, but this is a topic to address later.
Now, in dynamic game theory—for example Kreps and Wilson (1982)—many
explanations for social cooperation have been provided where the agents’ beliefs
and expectations are also taken into account. Since these beliefs and expectations
are conditional upon the observed social practices and corresponding rules, one
could ask whether in dynamic game theory much of  the points just made
concerning beliefs about social rules are already accounted for.
However, the usual procedure in dynamic game theory is still to derive social
cooperation from the atomistic interaction of  “self-goal” pursuing agents. It is true
that much game theory analysis resorts to the notion of  beliefs.
 
3
 
 But this is done
in order to derive social behaviour from individual intentionality 
 
plus
 
 individual
beliefs. If  the beliefs of  human agents are taken to be individual beliefs about the
other individual’s own beliefs, we still have a case of  individual intentionality, not
a case where common beliefs are shared by different individuals. On Searle’s
(1995: 25) approach, on the other hand, both beliefs and individual intentionality
are explained through the notion of  collective intentionality.
 
5. SOCIAL RULES AND HUMAN AGENCY
 
There are, nevertheless, some other problematic issues that are commonly associated
with Searle’s notion of  collective intentionality. Collective intentionality is often
reduced to individual intentionality under the conviction that doing so is the only
way to preserve the autonomy of  the human agent. Searle notes that:
 
“[. . .] it has seemed that anybody who recognizes collective intentionality as a primitive form of
mental life must be committed to the idea that there exists some Hegelian world spirit, a
collective consciousness, or something equally implausible. The requirements of  methodological
individualism seem to force us to reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality.”
(Searle 1995: 25)
 
If  collective intentionality meant a collective consciousness that somehow would
determine human action, it would ultimately preclude the autonomy of  the
human agent. Sen’s own terms already create a similar tension between social
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structures and human agency, since Sen argues that social rules must be “taken
for granted” by agents when interacting:
 
“If  the sense of  identity takes the form of  partly disconnecting a person’s choice of  actions from
the pursuit of  self-goal, then a non-inferior outcome can well emerge even without any formal
contract or enforcement. One of  the ways in which the sense of  identity can operate is through
making members of  a community accept certain rules as part of  obligatory behavior toward
others in the community. It is not a matter of  asking at each time, What do I get out of  it? How
are my goals furthered in this way?, but of  taking for granted the case for certain patterns of
behavior toward others.
In fact, acceptance of  rules of  conduct toward others with whom one has some sense of  identity
is part of  a more general behavioral phenomenon of  acting according to fixed rules, without
following the dictates of  goal maximization. Adam Smith had emphasized the importance of
such ‘rules of  conduct’ in social achievement: ‘Those general rules of  conduct, when they have
been fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, are of  great use in correcting misrepresentations
of  self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation’ ([1790]:
160)” (Sen 2002: 216/217).
 
So, for Sen, “rule-based conduct” is a phenomenon that cannot be entirely
derived from the interaction of  “self-goal” pursuing agents (as in traditional game
theory) because, for one thing, (fixed) rules of  conduct are already pre-existent
(and taken for granted) at each moment when individuals act.
But Sen’s claim that “fixed rules” of  conduct must be “taken for granted” when
engaging in social behaviour, for example, could seem to suggest a deterministic
view where social “rules of  conduct” are reified and human agency is entirely
determined by (“fixed”) social rules. It could seem that we have criticised a
conception where collective intentionality and social rules of  conduct are reduced
to individual intentionality, to move towards a diametrically opposite conception
where human action is completely determined by social rules, or the social
structure of  which these social rules are a constitutive part, or some collective
consciousness.
In earlier writings, Sen addresses the topic of  determinism, and defends a form
of  historical determinism from several criticisms, trying to allow for a conception
where an action can be causally determined, but nevertheless agents are free in
the sense that they are following values and preferences:
 
“Let there be three alternative policies, A, B and C, open to a given set of  men leading
respectively to results A
 
′
 
, B
 
′
 
 and C
 
′
 
. They like, let us say, B
 
′
 
 best of  all and, therefore, choose to
do B. There was no external compulsion for them to choose B, but they do so because they
prefer B
 
′
 
. Thus, in a certain sense (and that is the only sense that matters to the people
involved), they are free to choose and B is the result of  their free choice. There is, therefore, no
reason for them to be fatalists. On the other hand, in so far as their values, preferences, impulses
and the reaction system determining the choice are products of  their inherited and acquired
nature, their choice is determined by the past. Given the causal relations, one would have to be
able to predict what they would have chosen, even though in the only sense that is relevant to
them as decision-makers, they were free to choose what they liked” (Sen 1959: 111)
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Here Sen is arguing for the causal efficacy of  past conditions (including social
factors like values, amongst others), suggesting a deterministic view of  the causal
relation in the social realm, while trying to preserve a notion of  human freedom
where the latter consists in following values, preferences and impulses, amongst
other factors.
However, is it sufficient for Sen’s conception of  freedom to see it as the ability
to engage in choices which are determined by values, preferences and other social
or natural conditions, as Sen does in this earlier writing? Or, looking at Sen’s latter
writings, is it sufficient for Sen’s account of  social behaviour that the latter consists
in permanently obeying to fixed rules, which are followed by the group we
identify with?
More recently, Sen (2006) also argues that human agents have a plurality of
identities, and that there is no need to see one of  these identities as the sole
determinant of  human action, which seems to suggest that human agents are able
to scrutinise, reflect upon, and be critical of, the social rules and norms which
characterise a given group that we may identify ourselves with. This idea is in line
with Sen’s (2002) conception of  rationality:
 
“Rationality is interpreted here, broadly, as the discipline of  subjecting one’s choices—of  actions
as well as of  objectives, values and priorities—to reasoned scrutiny. Rather than defining
rationality in terms of  some formulaic conditions that have been proposed in the literature (such
as satisfying some prespecified axioms of  ‘internal consistency of  choice’, or being in conformity
with ‘intelligent pursuit of  self-interest’, or being some variant of  maximizing behavior),
rationality is seen here in much more general terms as the need to subject one’s choices to the
demands of  reason.” (Sen 2002: 4)
 
So the account of  rationality that Sen defends is one where rationality does
not consist in following one preference ordering, set of  values, fixed rules, or
identity, but rather to have the capacity of  reflecting upon preferences, values,
rules, and identity, and possibly changing them. So to see human action as
totally determined by underlying social rules, structures, identities, or
collective consciousness, would be inconsistent with Sen’s (1987, 1997, 2002) own
conception of  agency and rationality, and with Sen’s (2006) more recent writings
on identity. Autonomy and freedom of  choice are essential to human agency
in Sen’s thinking.
Furthermore, Sen (1997) also argues that preference orderings can be irreducibly
incomplete, in the sense that it may not be possible to rank two options A and B
in any way, which means that in such cases it will be impossible to predict human
choice.
There is thus a tension in Sen’s work, which is also present in later writings,
concerning the way in which human action is caused (including the causal role
of  social structures, “fixed rules” and identity), and human freedom. Sen does not
clarify how it can be the case that human agents take for granted fixed rules (or
have their actions in some way causally determined by past conditions), and
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nevertheless have the capacity of  changing these rules. If  human agents have the
capacity of  changing rules, we fail to see in what sense rules are simply to be taken
for granted.
To be consistent with Sen’s analysis, one must allow for the existence of  social
rules as irreducible to human agency (so that social rules can be “taken for
granted”), but human agency must not be seen as entirely determined by social
rules—so that freedom of  choice exists, and Sen’s conception of  rationality and
agency can be maintained. The problem is that once we assume that the causal
relation must be unidirectional (either social rules, or values, determine human
agency, or social rules are reducible to the atomistic interaction of  human
agents), our solution to this problem will consist in reducing one of  these concepts
(social rules or human agency) to the other. The key to this imbroglio must be a
conception where neither social rules nor human agency can be reduced to
something else, or to each other.
I will now argue that in order to make Sen’s conception of  collective identity
coherent with his writings on agency and rationality, Sen’s notion of  identity must
be seen under the light of  a social ontology perspective in which both social rules
of  behaviour and human agency are ontologically real, and ontologically distinct
from (and irreducible to, albeit dependent upon) each other. I will draw upon a
series of  contributions under the heading of  critical realism—on which see Archer,
Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie (1998), Archer (1995, 2000), Bhaskar (1975,
1989), or Lawson (1997, 2003)—to explain the interaction between human
agency and social rules.
I will argue that the critical realist transformational conception of  social activity
can be fruitfully combined with Sen’s argument against non-cooperative game
theory analysis. This ontological distinction will help us to explain why: (i) social
rules are already pre-existent at each moment; and (ii) freedom of  choice and
reasoned scrutiny is not denied.
 
6. THE TRANSFORMATIONAL MODEL OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY
 
Like Sen, critical realists hold a view of  social behaviour where the latter is
irreducible to the atomistic interplay of  “self-goal” pursuing agents. According to
critical realism, social rules are part of  an enduring (dynamic) social structure,
drawn upon by human agents. This follows from the critical realist transforma-
tional model of  social activity.
In the transformational model of  social activity, social structures (comprising
social rules) are not only the continuously reproduced and/or transformed unin-
tended outcome of  intentional human agency, but also the condition of  possibility
of  individual agency. Based on the social structure, human agents build their
expectations and beliefs about what can happen. Agents take into account that
what other agents do is constrained or facilitated by this social structure, which
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provides an enduring reality that enables agents to engage in coordinated and
cooperative behaviour.
Note, nevertheless, that to say social structures, including social rules, are
pre-existent at each moment does not mean they do not depend upon human
agency, from which they first emerged. For Lawson (1997: 63), “[e]mergence may
be defined as a relationship between two features or aspects such that one arises
out of  the other and yet, while perhaps being capable of  reacting back to it,
remains causally and taxonomically irreducible to it”. Social structures are not
only the necessary condition of  human action, but also the consequence of  human
intentional agency, from which the former emerge. As Lawson explains:
 
“[R]eproduction or transformation as occurs is the result of  capable human beings purposefully
going about their daily lives and tasks, interpreting themselves, their purposes and the social
order in very definite ways, and continually interacting with (including copying) others.”
(Lawson 2003: 130)
 
But even though social structures emerge from human agency, both social
structures and human agency are irreducible to each other. The reason why
social structures and human agency are both irreducible to each other is
because they are 
 
ontologically distinct
 
. Remember that ontology is an enquiry to the
nature of  reality, which investigates the entities that exist, and their properties.
So to say that both social structures and human agency are ontologically real
and distinct entities means that: (a) both social structures and human agency are
a constitutive part of  social reality (of  social being); and (b) even though social
structures and human agency are interdependent, they are different modes of
social being.
Rules of  behaviour are attached to the social position to which human
agents slot within a social structure, not to human agents themselves. Even if  we
assume, following Searle (1995), that human agents share intentional states whenever
engaging in social behaviour, the social structure in which they are positioned
would still be, according to the critical realist perspective, ontologically distinct
from the human agent who slots into it, and from her or his own subjectivity.
Some social structures and communities will be more important in shaping the
personality and identity of  the individual than others (and different individuals
will prioritise different social structures and communities to which they may
belong in different ways). But whatever the importance that a given social struc-
ture or community has for our personality and identity, it still remains the case
that our reasoning, subjectivity and reflexivity gives us the possibility of  at least
trying to choose and change our identities, affiliations and social positions—see
Archer (2000, 2007) for a discussion.
The fact that it may be extremely difficult to choose and change our identities,
affiliations and social positions, shows how social structures play an important role
in facilitating or constraining human agency, but does not entail that there is no
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distinction between the social structures in which we are positioned on the one
hand, and our own subjectivity and reflexivity on the other hand—for the mere
possibility of  choosing and changing our identities, affiliations and social positions,
even if  unrealised in practice, is sufficient for us to recognise the ontological
distinction between social structures and human agency. It is because of  this
ontological distinction that social structures are not merely reproduced through
human agency (as it would be in a conception where social structures would
determine human agency), but also transformed.
Now, how does this transformational conception of  social activity help us to
understand Sen’s notion of  “collective” identity? Remember that, in Sen’s view,
one would have to allow for both: (i) the primacy of  collective identity, in a
conception where human agents take “for granted the case for certain patterns of
behaviour toward others”, while “acting according to fixed rules”; and (ii) that
freedom of  choice and freedom of  scrutinising goals and values be a central
component of  social reality. Most mainstream economic theory models, where social
rules of  conduct are derived from atomistic self-goal pursuit, are inconsistent with
claim (i)—in fact, this is the core of  Sen’s critique of  traditional game theory.
Models where social structures are reified (and determine behaviour) are certainly
consistent with claim (i), but are incompatible with claim (ii).
The transformational model of  social activity, on the other hand, is consistent
with both claims (i) and (ii). In the transformational model of  social activity, both
social rules of  conduct and freedom of  choice can be real constituents of  social
reality (as they must be for Sen), in a conception where social structures (including
social rules) and human agency are ontologically distinct (albeit interdependent)
modes of  being.
Hence, it seems that the transformational model of  social activity provides us
with an account that renders Sen’s views on social behaviour and on agency (and
rationality) coherent. Even though the social structure arises through the
interaction of  human agents, these agents take such structure (and the rules and
positions it comprises) as given at each moment they act—just like in Sen’s
analysis “rules of  conduct” are “taken for granted”. So when human agents
identify themselves with a community, they have the capacity to follow the rules
of  such community, but their actions are not determined by the social structures
which characterise such community.
 
7. ON THE CAUSAL ROLE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES
 
It is important to note that the causal role of  social structures has been a subject
of  much controversy. While it is recognised by authors like Archer (1995, 2000,
2007) Bhaskar (1975, 1989) or Lawson (1997, 2003) that emergent social structures
do have a causal role, the exact status of  emergent structures constitutes a subject
of  much debate.
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Even in recent discussions, the causal efficacy of  social structures still raises
many doubts—on which see, for example, Elder-Vass (2007a, 2007b), King
(2007), Porpora (2007) and Varela (2007)—much stimulated by the differences
between the interpretation of  the putative causal role of  social structures in critical
realism and in Harré’s writings—see Harré and Bhaskar (2001)—and especially
by Harré’s criticism of  the presupposition that social structures have a causal
efficacy on their own.
Harré and Varela (1996) argue that only particular entities possess causal pow-
ers. An object is what Harré and Varela call a “powerful particular”, that is, a
causal agent, endowed with causal powers, in virtue of  its intrinsic nature or
structure. But for Harré and Varela, it is human agents, and not social structures,
who possess causal powers and initiate an action. Thus, it is human agents, and
not social structures, who are the powerful particulars in the social realm, and
hence the attribution of  causal efficacy to society is a mistake—for a criticism of
Harré’s position see also Kaidesoja (2007).
A possible solution to the debate concerning the causal role of  social structures
has been suggested by Paul Lewis (2000) who, following Bhaskar (1989), argues
that the Aristotelian distinction between material causes and efficient causes could
clarify this point. According to Bhaskar and Lewis, social structures could be seen
as material causes which enable or constrain the types of  action which can occur,
while human agency is the efficient cause of  an event. Thus, only human agents
would be what Harré and Varela (1996) call “powerful particulars”, since only
they are the efficient cause that initiates an action. However, as critical realists
argue, this action would be constrained or enabled by the material cause, namely
social structures. This solution has been also suggested in the context of  Sen’s
capability approach in Martins (2007b).
Manicas (2006: 72/73) argues that the solution Lewis suggests does not provide
a clear analogy with the Aristotelian example, in which the marble is the material
cause, while the sculptor is the efficient cause, of  the production of  a sculpture,
for marble is “independent of  persons and their actions and thus can have causal
powers”, while “social structure is concept- and activity-dependent and agency-
dependent”. However, if  we approach the idea using the notion of  emergence the
analogy is clear enough. The concept of  a material cause can be seen as a way
to conceptualise the idea that once a given entity arises of  a lower level, it
becomes a material with a set of  emergent properties which have causal powers.
The marble emerges as a solid entity from a lower level of  atoms and mole-
cules. Its emergent properties, such as solidity, are permanently reproduced
through the lower level activity of  atomic and molecular phenomena, in the same
way that emergent social structures are constantly reproduced through human
practice guided by conceptions. We need neither see the marble as being dependent
upon of  the activity of  human agents, or social structures as being independent
from the activity of  human agents, for the analogy to hold. Although human
activity constitutes the lower level from which social structures emerge, it is not
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the lower level from which marble emerges. So for the analogy to hold, each
emergent entity must be dependent upon the activity of  the respective lower level
from which it emerges: the activity of  atomic and molecular phenomena in what
the marble is concerned, human activity in what concerns social structures.
In other words, from the point of  view of  the production of  the sculpture, the
marble, as an emergent entity with all its emergent properties such as solidity, is
used as a material through which the efficient causation of  the labour of  the
sculptor will produce something. In the same way, social structures are an emergent
material used by an agent, who is the efficient cause, to perform an action. The
dependence upon a lower level activity for the maintenance of  emergent proper-
ties is true both for the marble and for the social structures, but both emergent
entities depend upon different lower levels.
Note that Sen (2002: 217) also says we act “acting according to fixed rules”.
This could suggest that rules are just what Aristotle calls a formal cause, for they
provide the form of  an action which we copy in a particular action. But must a
rule be seen as an exact description of  an action or practice? Lawson argues:
 
“any rule only carries normative or legitimising or facilitating (constitutive/regulative/moral/
semantic) force. A social rule, in other words, is a formulation of  action that, under specified
conditions, must, should, or can usefully, legitimately, meaningfully, or advisedly, etc., be carried
out, rather than a prediction or observation of  an action.” (Lawson 2003: 37)
 
And he continues:
 
“social rules are ontologically distinct from social practices. A recognition of  this follows once we
observe, and enquire into (transcendentally deduce) the conditions of  possibility of  the already
noted widespread feature of  experience that practices governed by rules are not always, or on
average, in conformity with our formulations of  these rules. The (intentional) act of  rebelling
requires as much knowledge of  the rules as does that of  conforming”. (Lawson 2003: 37)
 
This suggests that actions need not conform to the form of  the rule, which is often
expressed as a norm or obligation or convention, and so the rule is only a material
cause in the sense that it constrains or enables behaviour through its influence on
human action.
In fact, the citation from Smith that Sen (2002: 217) chooses above, also
suggests Lawson’s interpretation of  rules, for Smith notes how “general rules of
conduct” which “have been fixed in our mind” help us to correct misrepresen-
tations and guide us in choosing “what is fit and proper to be done in our
particular situation”. So although for Smith and Sen rules are fixed in our mind,
they need not be seen as determining our action, nor must our action conform
exactly to the form of  rule, albeit the rule influences the action, by guiding our
choice.
Rules do have a form. In fact, Lawson (2003: 36) suggests that social rules are
generalised procedures of  action which “can be expressed as injunctions of  the
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form ‘if  x do y under conditions z’”. But so does marble, which from a physical
or chemical perspective can be seen as being characterised by a given atomic or
molecular form or structure, and belonging to a given geological type or form.
But 
 
in what concerns the efficient cause which is a particular action of  the sculptor
 
, marble is
taken as an (emergent) material cause, just like 
 
in what concerns the efficient cause which
is a particular human agent
 
, social rules are taken as an (emergent) material cause.
 
8. THE HUMAN AGENT AS A STRUCTURED INDIVIDUAL
 
Searle evades the problems associated with the conceptualisation of  the putative
causal role of  social structures, using the term causation to denote only physical
causation. Manicas (2006: 57) writes that “Searle has rightly argued that more
fundamental than the distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, or ‘mind’ and
‘body’ is the distinction between those features of  the world that exist independently
of  us and those that are dependent on us for their existence”. Searle (1995) names
the features of  the world that exist independently of  us as “brute facts”, and the
features of  the world that are dependent on us for their existence as “institutional
facts”. Now, if  Searle wants to give priority to brute (or physical) causation, how
can he accommodate social institutions in his framework?
Searle conceptualises the causal impact of  social institutions of  human
behaviour through his thesis of  the Background. Searle argues that: “[i]ntentional
states function only given a set of  Background capacities that do not themselves
consist in intentional phenomena” (Searle 1995: 129). For Searle, the Background
is “the set of  nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional
states to function” (Searle 1995: 129). Capacities are “abilities, dispositions,
tendencies, and 
 
causal structures
 
 generally” (Searle 1995: 129, emphasis in original).
The Background is thus a key element to conceptualise neurophysiological
causation and the impact of  social institutions on the latter. Searle (1995: 129)
argues that since “we do not know how these structures function at a neurophy-
siological level, we are forced to describe them at a much higher level”. Searle
explains that the term “
 
[e]nabling
 
 is meant, then, to be a causal notion” (Searle
1995: 130), that is, these pre-intentional or non-intentional capacities “function
causally in the production of  certain sorts of  intentional phenomena” (Searle
1995: 130), where intentional states are “conscious”. Searle continues:
 
“The key to understanding the causal relations between the structure of  the Background and
the structure of  social institutions is to see that the Background can be causally sensitive to the
specific forms of  the constitutive rules of  the institutions without actually containing any beliefs
or desires or representations of  those rules” (Searle 1995: 141).
 
The Background’s capacities and causal structures include our dispositions and
tendencies to engage in given intentional states, including habits and dispositions
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to engage in social behaviour. It is important to note that, for Searle, the
Background enables rule following behaviour, but some actions enabled by the
Background need not conform to any rule at all.
By using the thesis of  the Background in order to accommodate the causal
effects of  social institutions, Searle ends up not clarifying the ontological status of
social structures. For if  Background causation takes place at the physical level of
brute causation, one can, using Searle’s framework, conceptualise the putative
causal role of  social institutions resorting only to brute causation. In earlier
writings, Sen addresses a similar problem, and argues:
 
“There is thus a certain difference between the form of  physical laws and that of  social laws
(. . .). The difference is, however, not necessarily due to any fundamental dissimilarity between
physical and human causal relations (the human relations may ultimately be purely bio-
chemical), but due to the number of  variables involved in any function” (Sen 1959: 105).
 
Of  course, Sen does not necessarily embrace any type of  physical reductionism
here, since he only suggests that human relations 
 
may
 
 ultimately bio-chemical, not
that we are sure they are. Sen seems to imply here that we are only sure of  the
existence of  causal relations in the social realm, not of  the level of  reality where
causality is placed.
Sen does not clarify whether the higher “number of  variables involved” leads
to emergent properties in the social realm. But this would be the central question
to address here, together with the connected question of  whether the social reality
that emerges can be seen as having a causal role of  its own (including a causal
role on the lower level from which it emerged), or whether causality exists only at
lower level, such as the bio-chemical level, or in the non-conscious capacities and
dispositions that Searle refers to in his thesis of  the Background.
It could be argued, for example, that to ascribe causality to physical phenomena
only has the advantage of  avoiding the reification of  social structures which,
Harré and Varela (1996) argue, would follow from the ascription of  causal efficacy
to social structures. However, the argument made above, that human agency is
the efficient cause, while social structures are the material cause, of  an action,
allows us to avoid the reification of  social structures without reducing causality to
the physical (or bio-chemical) realm.
But one must remember that to acknowledge social structures as material causes
is not to deny that social structures, like any emergent entity, are permanently
dependent upon the lower level from which they emerged, such as the non-
conscious capacities and dispositions which enable social behaviour. In fact, such
capacities and dispositions are essential for the critical realist explanation of  social
structures as emergent entities.
For example, Lawson (2003) refers to ideas very similar to Searle’s thesis of  the
Background, although using a different term for it, namely the term “habitus”,
following Pierre Bourdieu (1990), but this does not prevent Lawson from reaching
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a conception of  social reality where the latter is emergent from the level of
physical causation—for a comparison of  Lawson’s and Searle’s conceptions see
Faulkner (2002).
A notion similar to Bourdieu’s “habitus”, or Searle’s Background, may in fact
be crucial to Sen’s conception of  agency too. Sen (1987, 1997, 2002) argues that
mainstream economic theory, and rational choice theory, should recognise that
human agents have multiple motivations, and that one preference ordering is not
sufficient to explain behaviour, for conflicting human motivations may lead to the
existence of  multiple preference orderings, and even incomplete preference
orderings, due to unresolved conflicts.
But Sen’s assumption of  multiple motivations presupposes a conception of  a
structured individual, which is best accommodated by acknowledging the
coexistence of  multiple dispositions in the human individual, such as Bourdieu
(1990) does in his notion of  the “habitus”, or Searle does in his theory of  the
Background—for an analysis of  the implications of  Searle’s thesis of  the Back-
ground for mainstream economic theory, and the rational choice theory approach
that Sen (2002) also criticises, see also Runde (2002).
In fact, the role of  underlying capacities and dispositions in human behaviour
is much related to the Aristotelian notion of  potential, which is often recognised
to be one of  the key ontological concepts in Sen’s work, especially in his capability
approach, where capabilities are seen as potential functionings—see Martins
(2006) for a discussion.
Now, it is sometimes held that one of  the main dissonances between the
Aristotelian view—which Sen (1999: 289) recognises as one of  his main
influences—and the Platonic view of  human behaviour is that, contrarily to Plato,
Aristotle held that virtue consists in the practical 
 
habit
 
 of  moderating affections,
rather than in moderate and right affections themselves—for a discussion see
Adam Smith (2002[1759]: 315–321). So if  virtuous behaviour lies in the habit of
moderation (rather than on moderate behaviour itself), as Aristotle believed, a
stronger emphasis should be placed on the ontological preconditions that enable
virtuous habits to emerge (rather than emphasising virtuous behaviour regardless
of  its conditions of  possibility).
The different types of  rules Sen (1997) mentions, viz. “conventional rule
following”, “social commitment”, or “moral imperatives” can involve different
levels of  conscious reflexivity. Reasoned scrutiny of  goals and values, an essential
aspect of  human agency in Sen’s perspective, will certainly be also a central
feature of  social behaviour. But note that even this type of  rational activity is
possible only because of  the “habitus”, or the Background’s capacities and
dispositions which enable intentional states.
Hence, ontological analysis of  underlying capacities and dispositions is essential
to help us to understand: (i) the habits of  moderating affections and moral
sentiments that Aristotle, Adam Smith and Sen refer to; (ii) how rules can be
continuously reproduced in our daily lives even though reasoned scrutiny of  goals
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and values is not permanently undertaken, enabling behaviour to be done
according to a sense of  collective identity; and (iii) reasoned scrutiny of  goals and
values. An understanding of  these ontological conditions of  possibility of  social
rules of  conduct and behaviour is essential for the development of  Sen’s critique
of  mainstream economic theory. The causal role of  these capacities and disposi-
tions is very important for critical realism, Searle and Sen.
 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
 
Human agents follow social rules of  behaviour that are often out of  phase with
their individual goals. Sen’s argument is not that self-interest must include
altruistic concerns, for in Sen’s definition self-goals may already include these
concerns. Sen’s point is that even when self-goals include altruist concerns,
cooperation cannot be explained as the outcome of  behaviour driven by those
goals only. This view contrasts with the line of  argument of  traditional game
theory analysis, where social behaviour is explained as the outcome of  the strategic
interaction of  human agents who engage in optimising behaviour (driven by
self-goal pursuit).
The transformational model of  social activity renders Sen’s suggestion that
“fixed rules” are often “taken for granted” compatible with Sen’s view of  agency,
rationality and freedom. Sen’s claim that one must “take for granted the case for
certain patterns of  behaviour toward others”, while “acting according to fixed rules”,
does certainly point towards the rejection of  voluntarism, and of  explanations of
social rules where these are entirely derived from (or explained only in terms of)
the individual interplay of  self-goal seeking agents. So social structures cannot be
explained only in terms of  the individual interaction of  self-goal pursuing agents.
However, if  one wants to adopt Sen’s viewpoint, one can neither argue that
social structures determine human agency, nor that they are reified in any sense,
for Sen argues that freedom of  choice and reasoned scrutiny of  goals and values
are essential features of  human behaviour—see, for example, Sen (2002, 2006).
The type of  social behaviour Sen refers to can be best understood within the
transformational conception of  social activity: cooperation can exist because
agents draw upon an ontologically distinct social structure that they continuously
reproduce and/or transform. This ontologically distinct social structure is a
material cause which, combined with the efficient causation of  the human agent,
leads to human action.
Furthermore, one can say that in Sen’s perspective, human beings are able to
“identify” with a community, and to pursue collective values, because they share
beliefs, desires and intentions—that is, because of  what Searle calls collective
intentionality. Notions like collective intentionality and Background capacities (or
Bourdieu’s “habitus”) can provide further help in the task of  understanding social
behaviour.
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Of  course, one must bear in mind that the work of  Sen, Searle or critical
realists provides only the conceptual tools for a different theory, by clarifying the
meaning of  the underlying categories that are used in social theories. This
clarification of  concepts and categories plays a distinct role from that of  providing
a fully-fledged theory of  social behaviour. It is just the starting point for a different
theory of  social behaviour.
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NOTES
 
1
 
 Sen explains that “economics has had two rather different origins, but related in
rather different ways, concerned respectively with ‘ethics’ on the one hand, and what may
be called ‘engineering’ on the other.” (Sen 1987: 2/3). Sen then argues that a closer contact
with the “ethics-related tradition” which “goes back at least to Aristotle” (1987: 3) can
enrich economic theorising. In addressing this relation between ethics and economics, Sen
points to two main areas of  contact: the “ethics-related view of  motivation”; and the
“ethics-related view of  social achievement”. The “ethics-related view of  motivation” is
concerned with the relation between ethics and behaviour, while the “ethics-related view
of  social achievement” addresses the issue of  how one should judge social achievement, or
in Aristotle’s terms, “the good of  man” (as discussed in Aristotle’s 
 
Politics
 
, and in 
 
The
Nichomachean Ethics
 
). Sen refers to the “ethics-related view of  motivation” as the “Socratic”
question of  “how should one live” (Sen 1987: 10), while referring to the “ethics-related
view of  social achievement” as the “Aristotelian” question (Sen 1987: 9/10). Much of  Sen’s
contribution has been concerned with developing these two views of  ethics. Sen’s writings
on rational behaviour, choice and agency have a strong influence of  the “ethics-related
view of  motivation” (the “Socratic” question). Sen draws upon the moral philosophy of
authors such as Adam Smith, explaining how many moral motivations that are developed
by these authors cannot be accommodated by mainstream microeconomic theorising.
Sen’s work on welfare economics and his “capability approach”, on the other hand, has
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been much concerned with the “ethics-related view of  social achievement” (the
“Aristotelian” question), and with the assessment of  human advantage and well-being. Of
course, the “ethics-related view of  motivation” and the “ethics-related view of  social
achievement”, are closely related, and Sen has also argued that questions of  social
achievement must be taken into account in human motivation. In this sense, the
“ethics-related view of  motivation” is not an exclusively “Socratic” question. Rather, it has
much to do with the “Aristotelian” question as well.
 
2
 
 When all players do not cooperate, we have the Nash (1951) equilibrium of  a single
simultaneous move game. A Nash equilibrium is defined as one in which all players play
the best response to the other player’s strategy—and in the simultaneous move prisoner’s
dilemma game the best response strategy is the non-cooperative strategy, for all players. In
an infinitely repeated game situation, the cooperative outcome could be achieved if  both
players would have the following strategy: to cooperate first, and afterwards to cooperate
if  and only if  the other player has cooperated in the previous stage. This way of  acting in
the context of  an infinitely repeated game is usually called a
 
 Nash reversion strategy
 
: players
behave cooperatively if  the other players also do so, but when they observe that the other
players are not behaving cooperatively, they revert to the non-cooperative strategy (that
constitutes the Nash equilibrium of  a single simultaneous move game). In a finitely
repeated game, however, it becomes more difficult to explain cooperative behaviour. In a
finitely repeated game, players will choose the non-cooperative strategy at the last stage of
the game, for at the last stage of  the game they will be in the same situation as in a single
simultaneous move game (where not cooperating is the dominant strategy). And then, by
backward induction (that is, by successively moving to the previous stage of  the game until
the first stage is reached) one can see that the non-cooperative strategy will be played at
every stage of  the game, because in all the successive stages of  the game the players will
be in a situation similar to that of  a single simultaneous move game. So it is always
preferable for players not to cooperate in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
In the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, the possibility of  cooperation is often
explained by relaxing assumptions on the mutual knowledge of  the players, or by assuming
 
myopic
 
 behaviour. Amartya Sen argues that “[i]n the formal literature, there have been
various attempts to explain the emergence of  cooperation by introducing some kind of  a
‘defect’ in either the knowledge, or the reasoning of  the players” (Sen 1987: 84), and hence
each player cooperates because (s)he does not realize that the non-cooperative strategy
would bring her or him a higher individual payoff.
 
3
 
 In a game represented in extensive form, beliefs are modelled through the probabilities
that the players attach to the event of  being at a given information set. The solution
concept of  a “weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium”, for example, draws upon the existence
of  such a system of  beliefs (in order to explain how equilibrium occurs). This weak perfect
Bayesian equilibrium consists in a profile of  strategies and a system of  beliefs, where the
profile of  strategies is sequentially rational (i.e., the player has no incentive at any stage to
change strategies given her or his beliefs) and the system of  beliefs is derived using the
Bayes’ rule (whenever possible) at each information node. A Nash equilibrium given a
system of  beliefs is defined similarly, with the difference that in such a case sequential
rationality is required 
 
only
 
 in the equilibrium path. These beliefs are about what happened
until the present stage. In game theory the system of  beliefs reflects information on what
other players may do insofar as it assigns probabilities to the event of  being at a given
information set given past actions. Notice that the relation between what Searle refers to
as beliefs, and what is usually referred to as a “system of  beliefs” in game theory, would
require further elaboration. But the fundamental aspect in both conceptions of  beliefs, for
our present purposes, is an assignment of  a probability to other agents’ actions given past
information.
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